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“It is yet another Civilized Power, with its banner of the Prince of Peace in one hand 
and its loot-basket and its butcher-knife in the other.” 
Mark Twain1 
 
I would like to thank the Ireland Institute for inviting me here this evening.  I must 
admit that when Finbar first contacted me and asked me to present something on 
Africa my first thought was ‘imperialism and Africa’ – no problem; ‘resistance in 
Africa’ – beyond the armed resistance that we hear so much about in the media – not 
so sure…  The fact that Bernie (Dwyer) was going to be speaking about resistance and 
alternatives in both Cuba and Latin America more broadly in the form of ALBA in the 
same session led me to thinking about the vast differences in our perceptions of these 
two parts of the world, most especially in our awareness and understanding of levels 
of political activism and resistance in both.   
 
Specifically, I found myself wondering why there appears to be no resistance to 
imperialism across the African continent on the scale of that encountered in different 
forms in Latin America.  Why (with the exceptions of the independence movements 
in the 1950s and the anti-apartheid movement in South Africa from the 1950s to the 
late 1980s) do we rarely talk of resistance in Africa?  Why is it all but invisible?  Why 
is it that, when thinking about Latin America, images of a political vibrancy, a 
dynamism, and, above all, a resistance to oppression, discrimination and 
marginalisation in their many forms come to mind yet, when our thoughts turn to 
Africa, this dynamism and energy is replaced by images of hunger, disease, poverty, 
civil strife, hopelessness and despair? 
 
Pondering these questions led me on to thinking about the nature, or natures, of 
imperialism itself.  There has been some discussion here this evening on this topic.  
As it is most commonly understood, imperialism refers to the creation and 
maintenance of unequal relationships between states wherein one state or people is 
subordinated to another.  While often associated with the global expansion of 
capitalism, as Edward Said in particular has taught us2, imperialism operates on 
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ideological and cultural levels as well as economic / financial ones.  I want to talk a 
little this evening about this ideological / cultural level and its potency and effects 
across the African continent as well as closer to home as it is this dimension which I 
feel is critical in understanding misrepresentations and/or silencing of resistance and 
dissent across the continent. 
 
What, following Said, we might call cultural imperialism involves the imposition of a 
particular set of beliefs, values, knowledge on diverse people and cultures.  In the case 
of Africa, such imperialist projects have alternated at different times and in different 
places between those aimed at ‘civilising’, ‘modernising’ and ‘saving’ African states 
and peoples.  The overall mission or justification notwithstanding, as in all imperialist 
projects, the African ‘other’ was (and continues to be) constructed by and in relation 
to the West.  As with Said’s Orient3, Africa has long been represented by a set of 
images, narratives and characteristics that serve to demonstrate how it is both alien 
and inferior to the West.  What we are talking about are not just differences in 
perceptions, values and knowledge.  What we are talking about here is the 
superimposition of one set of values and knowledge over many other sets, rendering 
invisible and void the values and knowledge systems of these many ‘others’.   
 
Two specific points in the case of Africa are worth noting in this regard.  First, this is 
not merely a historical phenomenon associated with the ‘great age of imperialism’ of 
the 1880s.  It is both historic and contemporary, and the continuities with the past are 
very clear.  Second, the hegemonic strategies employed in consolidating the 
imperialist project in different African states has resulted in a far more complex geo-
political division between imperialists and imperialised than the West versus ‘Other’ 
models suggest.  With the active support of an African elite, the imperialist discourse 
has become deeply embedded within African societies, imbuing social institutions, 
discourses and practices to the point where, in many countries and among many 
peoples, a sense of inferiority to and dependence on the West prevails.  Moreover, the 
same imperialist discourse also remains deeply embedded in society here.  With 
‘black baby’ images alternating with scenes of civic violence and devastation, it is 
little wonder that the Irish public feels a duty to ‘save’ ‘the less fortunate’ and ‘the 
needy’ of Africa.  Lacking any context to these bulletins and images, in a world of 
soundbytes where the contexts of ‘others’ are simply too complex and alien to 
communicate, the purposeful march of imperialism escapes under the public radar, 
and the resistance of those marginalised and dispossessed is either misinterpreted 
under the guise of ‘yet another ethnic conflict’ or rendered invisible altogether.  
 
Yet wherever there is oppression, there will be resistance.  The challenge is to 
uncover, explore and attempt to understand this resistance from the perspective of 
those resisting.  I would like to talk this evening about one such example of resistance 
in Malawi.  Before turning to the specific case of Malawi however, I would like to 
firstly talk about imperialism in Africa in the twenty first century more broadly as, 
while largely contiguous with the period before, it has recently gained considerable 
momentum with a second ‘Scramble for Africa’ now underway.  This new ‘Scramble’ 
has been consolidated and securitised through the new ‘failed state’ discourse post 
9/11 and represents a worrying new departure in the evolution of naked economic 
imperialism, a departure all the more alarming in that it is masked by the more benign, 
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indeed benevolent trappings of cultural imperialism, once again purporting to ‘save 
Africa’.   
 
 
Hearts and minds:  Imperialism over the centuries 
 
A story explaining how the Europeans conquered Africa during the first ‘Scramble for 
Africa’ tells of how, when the Europeans first arrived, they had the bible and the 
Africans had the land.  The Africans closed their eyes to pray, and when they opened 
their eyes, the Europeans had the land and the Africans had the bible.  The story is 
instructive as it illustrates not only the naked economic imperialism of the era, but 
also the more insidious cultural dimensions of this conquest.  Colonial powers 
captured not just land and associated resources, but through the values and ideologies 
of the bible (literally and symbolically), hearts and minds also.   
 
Africa’s subjection to imperialist projects and forces goes back a long way, with the 
‘Scramble for Africa’ of the 1800s synonymous with the ‘Great’ Age of Imperialism.  
While the colonial era represents a relatively short time in the continent’s long 
history, its legacies – from the carving up of the continent at the Berlin Conference of 
1884, to the forms of direct and indirect rule imposed by European rulers – continue 
to mark social, economic and political life on the continent.  Ethnic groups remain 
divided across state borders, natural resources are unequally distributed, many 
countries are landlocked and, following colonial rule, a legacy of unaccountability 
prevails in public life with politics seen as largely synonymous with personal wealth 
and power4.  On an economic and cultural front, attempts to ‘modernise’ the continent 
and its so-called ‘backward’ societies through the importation of the Western 
capitalist development model following the ‘discovery’ of poverty on the continent by 
the US post World War II5 resulted in a crippling indebtedness in the 1980s.  Once 
again exploited, this time as a pawn in the Cold War between imperial powers West 
and East, wars were spawned, economies destroyed and despots supported as African 
elites colluded with imperial powers in pillaging their continent and their peoples of 
their wealth and resources.  African peoples once again suffered the arrogance and 
superiority of Western imperialism as the IMF’s structural programmes of the 1980s, 
aimed at ‘restructuring’ economies to repay debts to Western creditors through the 
imposition of stringent cutbacks in health, education, social services and the public 
sector wreaked social and political devastation across the continent.  Following the 
fall of the Berlin wall, the 1990s witnessed the importation of more Western models – 
this time on a political front under the guise of Western ‘democratisation’ and ‘good 
governance’, both ironically relatively rare in any substantive form in the Western 
societies advocating them.  In short, be it the naked imperialism of the colonial era, 
the geo-politically driven imperialism post World War II, or the seemingly more 
benevolent imperialism of recent decades, African societies and peoples have been 
systematically exploited, oppressed and marginalised as an elite hegemony from their 
own countries have colluded with global powers in marginalising the continent, 
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leading to economic devastation, a widespread distrust of political leaders, a lack of 
confidence in local capacities, and an undermining of indigenous cultures and values. 
 
 
Saving while plundering Africa: Imperialism in the Twenty-First Century 
 
In 2001, Tony Blair famously described Africa as ‘a scar on the conscience of the 
world’.  It is worth looking more closely at this speech as it is illustrative of both the 
depth and the scope of the contemporary imperialist project in the twenty-first 
century.  
 
“The state of Africa is a scar on the conscience of the world.  But if the world 
as a community focused on it, we could heal it.  And if we don’t, it will become 
deeper and angrier.”6 
 
Two things jump out from these three simple sentences.  First, the idea that we can 
‘heal’ Africa.  Over a century of imperialistically driven oppression, marginalisation 
and exploitation on, the arrogance continues apace, the past is neatly glossed over, the 
West is once again healer and saviour, bearing no apparent connection to the disease.  
Second, and this is an important recent development, the rationale, ‘…if we don’t, it 
will become deeper and angrier’.  The angry face of marginalised Africa is now 
revealed.  It has become important to contain this.  Enter the new ‘failed state’ 
discourse of the twenty-first century, a discourse redolent of the binary ‘with us or 
against us’ imperialism of the post 9/11 era and one employed to justify the 
securitisation of the second scramble currently taking place across the African 
continent.   
 
There are two faces to imperialism in Africa in the current century.  One, the more 
visible, benevolent, redeeming even, once again depicting Africa as a basket case, 
helpless, needy and lacking capacity to address its own problems, is the ‘Saving 
Africa’ face.  Cultural imperialism is alive and well, providing a convincing rationale 
for intervention in this form.  This is the face of the aid industry, the Millennium 
Development Goals, the Make Poverty History campaign, the Live8 concerts, the 
‘Year for Africa’.  And who can argue with goals which aim at halving world poverty, 
attaining universal primary education, ending the spread of HIV/AIDS, achieving 
gender equality, together with many other laudable, and necessary, goals by the year 
2015?  It is certainly a powerful face.  Yet what does it deliver? 
 
Just five years away from the MDG targets, it is now apparent that none will be met.  
Why?  Because the ‘Saving Africa’ model highlights the symptoms yet fails to tackle 
the fundamental roots of Africa’s poverty – continued exploitation made possible by 
continuing to deny African people power and a voice in their own futures.  UK 
commentator George Monbiot articulates this well. 
 
The G8 leaders and the business interests that their summit promoted can 
absorb the Make Poverty History demands for aid, debt, even slightly 
fairer terms of trade, and lose nothing. They can wear our colours, speak 
our language, claim to support our aims, and discover in our agitation not 
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new constraints but new opportunities for manufacturing consent. Justice, 
this consensus says, can be achieved without confronting power7. 
       
Thus, well publicised international commitments on debt relief and fairer trade 
policies have delivered little in the way of concrete policy or impact.  From 1970 to 
2002 the West provided $530 billion in aid and loans while African countries repaid 
$540 billion in debt service8.  Meanwhile, trade policies heavily weighted in favour of 
Western nations renders meaningless the concept of free or indeed fair trade, with 
heavily subsided Western exports flooding African markets undercutting African 
producers.  Oxfam International has estimated that a one per cent increase in Africa’s 
share of world exports would be worth five times as much as the continent’s share of 
aid and debt relief9.   
 
The real problem lies not in the levels of aid, debt and trade.  Nor does it lie in the 
appalling levels of poverty, HIV/AIDS, illiteracy, migration, gender inequality, 
conflict.  These are just symptoms.  The real problem lies in the egregious power 
imbalances between African people and the hegemonic alliances of their elites and the 
West.  Until this realisation dawns, until the imperialistic discourse of a needy, 
incapacitated continent permeating the West is dismantled, Africa will never be saved.  
For the project is not to save Africa from itself, it is to save Africa from ourselves.   
 
While political leaders, the media and public alike invest heavily in the support and 
promotion of the ‘Save Africa’ face, a second face of contemporary imperialism is 
quietly gaining momentum.  The ‘Second Scramble for Africa’ reveals a far less 
benevolent face, a face of naked greed and exploitation as, once more, the African 
continent and her peoples are stripped of their resources, wealth and opportunity.  The 
great paradox of Africa is that, although home of the highest levels of poverty and 
inequality in the world, the continent is one of the richest with respect to natural 
resources in the form of oil, natural gas, uranium, coal, gold, diamonds, coltan, cobalt, 
copper, chrome, tin, iron, nickel, platinum, lead, zinc, timber… the list is endless.  
And it to this wealth of resources – in particular, in the context of instability in the 
Middle East, oil and natural gas – that global powers are now turning.  Africa now 
provides 15 per cent of US oil requirements, with this estimated to increase to 25 per 
cent in the next 10 years10.  Meanwhile China, seeking to fuel its own domestic highly 
resource dependent growth, has become a major competitor for these reserves with 
over 800 projects established in the last four-five years with large investments in oil, 
timber and minerals in Chad, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Nigeria, Sierra 
Leone, the Sudan, Zambia, Zimbabwe and elsewhere11.  Billions of dollars have been 
invested in Africa and tens of thousand of US, European and Chinese workers (among 
others) are on the ground in many countries.   
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9 Cited in The Economist, December 18th, 2004.   
10 Margaret C. Lee (2006) ‘The 21st Century Scramble for Africa’, Journal of Contemporary African 
Studies, 24(3), pp. 303-330. 
11 Raphael Kaplinsky and Mike Morris (2009) ‘Chinese FDI in Sub-Saharan Africa: Engaging with 
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A significant development in this second Scramble has been the securitisation of 
access to these natural resources following the events of 9/11.  With US Foreign 
Secretary Condoleeza Rice announcing in October 2001 that ‘Africa is critical to our 
war on terrorism’, there has been a significant increase in US military presence in 
Africa.  The links with oil and natural resources are clear, with many commentators 
noting that US strategy in Africa is now focused on military securing of transportation 
channels of raw materials to the US12.  These actions are further justified by the new 
global ‘failed state’ discourse which, focusing exclusively on internal unrest while 
ignoring the role played by international powers in fostering this, is now put forward 
as justification for a new imperialism.  Thus, according to the US National Security 
Strategy of 2002, ‘America is now threatened less by conquering states than by failing 
ones’.  According to US Foreign Policy magazine’s ‘failed state index’, in 2009, 11 
out of the world’s top 20 so-called ‘failed states’ were in Africa13.  The UK too has 
adopted this discourse with Foreign Secretary Jack Straw in 2002 devoting an entire 
speech to the topic of ‘Failed and Failing States’14.  In a discourse bearing more than a 
passing resemblance to Conrad’s ‘Heart of Darkness’, Straw ominously warned 
British citizens of the dangers of failed states to their own security… ‘we need to 
remind ourselves that turning a blind eye to the breakdown of order in any part of the 
world, however distant, invites direct threats to our national security and well-
being’15.  Nor is the Irish state immune to this discourse.  As Irish Aid’s White Paper 
illustrates, security issues also now represent a priority within our own aid 
programme. 
 
Security, development and human rights are mutually reinforcing: advances in 
one area require and reinforce progress in the others. Threats to security and 
threats to development do not respect national borders. Supporting development, 
security and the realisation of rights for people in developing countries ultimately 
has global benefits, including in Ireland.16 
       
Two issues in relation to these developments in Western discourse on Africa need to 
be highlighted.  First, swaying ambiguously between Rudyard’s ‘White Man’s 
Burden’ and Conrad’s ‘Heart of Darkness’ and once more conjuring images of a 
world where, in a neat censoring of history where the role of imperialist powers are 
effaced from the narrative, the efficient, developed, stable and well-governed export 
assistance, democracy, liberty and stability to the needy, unstable, poor and 
vulnerable, it is apparent that imperialism is alive and well in the Western world.  But 
that’s not all.  Bolstered by images of war-ravaged ‘failed states’, where resistance is 
simplistically portrayed and grossly misinterpreted as being rooted in local barbarism, 
greed, and ethnic and religious intolerance, imperialism is now globally justified as 
the ‘Securitising Africa’ face of contemporary imperialism reveals itself.  This has 
significant repercussions for a) how we interpret and react to the policy and actions of 
our own political leaders and their allies, and b) how we perceive and interact with 
                                                 
12 See, for example, Abramovic (2004) ‘United States: The New Scramble for Africa’, Le Monde 
Diplomatique, July 8-9, Paris; Barnes (2005) ‘Global Flows: Terror, Oil and Strategic Philanthropy’, 
Review of African Political Economy, 32(104/5), pp.235-252. 
13 http://www.foreignpolicy.com/story/cms.php?story_id=4350  
14 Cited in Rita Abrahamsen (2004) ‘A Breeding Ground for Terrorists? Africa and Britain’s “War on 
Terrorism”’, Review of African Political Economy, 31(102), pp. 677-684. 
15 idem. 
16 Government of Ireland, (2006) White Paper on Irish Aid (Dublin: Government Publications), p. 22. 
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our African neighbours and friends in Ireland, together with how we analyse and 
interpret their actions at home.  
 
Second, it is important to be aware that, given the interests and requirements of 
imperialist powers, development and security strategies are aimed at the containment 
of discontent and unrest rather than the transformation of the exploitative systems and 
structures that give rise to them.  Thus, following the World Bank’s 2006 World 
Development Report which advocates social safety nets as a parallel to mainstream 
policies marginalising the poor (trade in particular is cited), aid efforts largely 
constitute apolitical interventions aimed at assisting the poor survive the fallout of 
wider political interventions17.  And, in relation to imperialism’s new ‘Securitising 
Africa’ face, as Rita Abrahamsen notes ‘It is important to recognise that 
securitisation is entirely compatible with the relatively feeble international response 
to the brutal and prolonged conflict in the DRC, or in Darfur. Rather than direct 
military action, the securitisation of Africa is more likely to give rise to policies of 
containment, or policing.’18.  Yet exploitation and oppression can never be contained.  
The marginalised will resist, and by paying attention to, rather than misinterpreting or 
ignoring this resistance, we learn a more of the nature of contemporary domination 
and imperialism. 
 
The dominant images and narratives of African social and political life tend to leave 
us with a binary impression of a people either violent and brutal in their resistance or 
powerless and subdued in their oppression.  However, life is never so simple, nor are 
people’s actions as they weigh up their strategies in their bid to survive.  Falling 
between these popular binaries, and less visible for that reason, lie a range of covert 
strategies of resistance of the marginalised which constitute expressions of ongoing 
and profound ideological challenge to the projects and plans of the powerful.  I would 
now like to turn to an example of such peaceful, yet determined resistance in Malawi.   
 
 
Resistance from below:  Resisting the imperial capitalist project in Malawi19 
 
Malawi is a small (twice the size of Ireland) landlocked country in Southern Africa 
and is home to approximately 14 million people.  Although not endowed with many 
natural resources, Malawi has, through the ‘Saving Africa’ face of development, a 
long history of international intervention.  This has supported the emergence of a 
national capitalist elite which has adopted and promoted the imperialist discourse of a 
poor, uneducated, illiterate population requiring ‘saving’, while benefiting greatly 
themselves in the process.  Malawi is notable both for its levels of inequality – it was 
reported as the third most unequal country in the world in the mid-1990s20 - and 
                                                 
17 Equity and Development: World Development Report 2006 (Washington: World Bank), p.10.  See 
also Ankie Hoogvelt (2001) Globalisation and the Postcolonial World: The New Political Economy of 
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Terrorism”’, Review of African Political Economy, 31(102), pp. 677-684. 
19 For a fuller account of this story, see Niamh Gaynor (2010) ‘The global development project 
contested: The local politics of the PRSP process in Malawi’, Globalizations,  
20 Mkandawire, Thandika (2003) ‘Freedom and Empowerment; in Bodo Immink, Samson Lembani, 
Martin Ott and Christian Peters-Berries (editors), From Freedom to Empowerment: Ten Years of 
Democratisation in Malawi (Lilongwe: Forum for Dialogue and Peace, Konrad Adenauer Foundation, 
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corruption.  The result has been a widespread distrust of political leaders and other 
elites matched by a closed, non-transparent political system.   
 
In common with the fate of many other African states which embraced the imperialist 
capitalist project of the 1960s and 1970s, by the 1980s Malawi was dealing with a 
crippling debt burden.  A small group of activists came together to form a Jubilee 
campaign which, linking with similar campaigns globally, lobbied for debt relief.  
Global campaigns finally yielded some success and, in 1999, the World Bank and 
IMF agreed to a level of relief as well as announcing that their widely criticised 
structural adjustment programmes would hereafter take their lead from national 
development plans.  These national development plans, called poverty reduction 
strategy programmes (PRSPs), were to be formulated in-country with the participation 
of a wide range of civic groups and actors.  With a poverty reduction ethos at their 
core, in theory they offered the potential to substantially transform Western-
dominated capitalist development models to those more suited to and addressing local 
needs and challenges.  As we will see however, in practice, with Western donors 
dominating the processes, this unfortunately did not happen. 
 
But back to events in Malawi.  On hearing of these developments, in 2000, activists 
within the Jubilee campaign organised meetings with a range of other civic groups 
(NGOs, trade unions, religious groups, academics) and resolved to form an activist 
network, thereafter known as the Malawi Economic Justice Network (MEJN) to lobby 
for inclusion in the PRSP process.  Their aim was to bring the neglected voices of the 
poor to the policy table and push for a more equitable national development model.  
They were initially regarded as successful in this quest, securing places for their 
members in 17 of the 21 different working groups and extending the timeframe of the 
process to allow for consultation with their wider network.  They also engaged in a 
high level of activism at a local level, translating the resultant strategy document into 
a simplified format in a number of local languages, as well as raising popular 
awareness of and pressure for the poverty focus of future policy.  However, as time 
evolved, people became aware that the resultant strategy differed little from the 
structural adjustment programmes of the past that had brought little economic respite 
and widespread social damage to the populace at large21.  Moreover, it soon became 
apparent that MEJN leaders had become effectively co-opted into the hegemonic elite 
that espoused little change from the past which had benefited them so well.  In line 
with donor policy, MEJN’s main input to the process had been to secure some funding 
for a range of social safety nets (prioritised poverty expenditures) as advocated by the 
World Bank as a containment measure.   
 
Having thus been co-opted, MEJN leaders began to complain that network members 
lacked the necessary ‘capacity’ to input in any meaningful way to the process and the 
projects that emerged from it.  Domestically, members resisted MEJN leaders’ 
demands to alter their approaches from more radical campaigning to technocratic 
policy work in line with the demands of donors and the political elite.  Conflicts 
developed and many members left the network.  Internationally however, MEJN was 
attracting interest for an entirely different reason.  International aid agencies, largely 
                                                                                                                                            
Malawi-German Programme for Democracy and Decentralisation, National Initiative for Civic 
Education, Malawi). 
21 This is due to a large amount of donor influence over the process.  Studies on PRSPs in many other 
countries also found that they, by and large, merely represented ‘old wine in new bottles’. 
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unconcerned with the fact that the new PRSP strategy looked much the same as 
previous failed strategies, and unaware of internal dynamics within the network, 
began lining up to contract MEJN to carry out budget monitoring projects on their 
behalf.  Using donor funding, MEJN leaders employed ‘professional’ staff to carry 
out the work, leaving the original members behind.  MEJN quickly grew from a 
grouping of voluntary activists employing one coordinator to a large organisation in 
its own right.  Drawing down a budget of US$ 900,000 between the years 2002-04 
and with funding from over 10 international donor agencies including Trócaire and 
Irish Aid, MEJN had clearly moved far beyond its activist roots. 
 
However, the expectations that MEJN had raised through its extensive media work 
and more radical approaches at the outset had left their mark.  Public debate, for 
MEJN had become extremely well-known as a catalyst for the resistance that was 
bubbling at the heart of Malawian society, centred on MEJN’s legitimacy in 
‘representing the poor’ as it claimed.  With an office and growing staff in Lilongwe, 
Malawi’s capital, MEJN seemed far removed from the concerns or exigencies of the 
poor.  Criticisms of its legitimacy grew.  In 2002, in an effort to stem this criticism, 
MEJN leaders began establishing a structure of local representation nationwide.  
MEJN Chapters were set up in all 28 of the 29 districts throughout the country during 
the years 2002-2004.  These consisted of committees of locally elected community 
leaders who were willing to work in a voluntary capacity to ensure that the 
perspectives and needs of their local communities were addressed both at district level 
(through their own lobbying actions using the MEJN label as a way to gain access to 
local elites) and at national level (through MEJN leaders’ ongoing policy and 
campaigning work).   
 
However, a fundamental contradiction soon emerged between what local Chapter 
members (and their communities) expected from MEJN leaders and what MEJN 
leaders expected from local communities.  While Chapter committee members saw 
themselves as a portal for the concerns and demands of their communities, feeding 
this up to MEJN at national level, MEJN leaders saw them as structures through 
which donor-funded projects could be carried out.  Again, MEJN leaders were 
meeting with resistance on the ground, with growing demands for support and 
accountability coming from their district level members for concrete action on distinct 
issues such as healthcare, schooling, local infrastructure, and the critical area of 
fertiliser subsidies which the World Bank insists should be reduced or removed 
although they have proven key in averting food shortages and famine22.   
 
The specific case of MEJN provides a doorway into the multiple sites of political 
struggle and contestation in Malawi and elsewhere.  It remains to be seen how MEJN 
leaders will negotiate the conflicting demands of the state and donors on the one hand, 
and Chapter members and their ‘communities’ on the other. One thing is clear 
however, bridging these relations and poised with one foot in, and one foot out of the 
hegemonic order, MEJN’s journey has served to demonstrate that, contrary to both the 
‘Save Africa’ and ‘Securitise Africa’ faces of contemporary imperialism, the 
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Malawian poor are neither passive, nor are they violent.  Rather, they are peacefully, 
yet determinately resistant.  MEJN’s experience serves to demonstrate that popular 
activism and resistance is alive and well in towns and villages throughout Malawi.   
 
 
Conclusion: Some lessons and what of ‘alternatives’? 
 
So what does MEJN’s journey teach us?  There are two main lessons we can draw.  
First, MEJN’s experience warns us to be wary of culturally imperialist discourses and 
attitudes towards Africa and her peoples that deny or misrepresent local agency and 
local activism and thus open the space to justify further exploitation under the guise of 
‘helping’, ‘assisting’, ‘securitising’ or indeed ‘saving’.  Second, the case of MEJN 
highlights the need to interrogate more fully the nature and practices of local 
organisations funded by Irish Aid – are they actually supporting social change or are 
they merely reinforcing political inequalities by strengthening local elites23?  And 
what is our (the public tax payer’s) role in this? 
 
I would like to finish, if I may, with a short word on the issue of ‘alternatives’, as 
these are mentioned in tonight’s title.  In the face of both material, but especially 
cultural imperialism, it is important to remember that there are always alternatives – 
many yet to be imagined.  However, there are not always spaces in which, or 
opportunities through which these may be imagined.  Nor are there always channels 
through which they can take shape. 
 
In relation to Africa, it is not our place to imagine alternatives.  It is however our 
place, and indeed our responsibility, to push for spaces in which these may be 
imagined, and equally, it is our responsibility to push for channels through which they 
might develop.  We can do this by challenging attitudes, discourses and practices 
which, under the guise of ‘saving’ or ‘securitising’ Africa, simplify and misrepresent 
the complexities of political and social life played out in the shadow of imperialism, 
and which deny the right and the power of African peoples to be authors of their own 
destinies, both in their own countries and on the international stage.   
 
Perhaps Africa is indeed a ‘White Man’s Burden’, but not as Kipling meant.  It is our 
Burden in revealing the extent to which we have, wittingly or not, participated in its 
continued marginalisation, exploitation and misrepresentation.  In opening our eyes to 
the complexities and wrongs of both the past and the present, a new Africa will be 
revealed, one that will hopefully lift the Burden for all, Westerners and Africans alike.   
 
 
Niamh Gaynor 
May 6th, 2010 
                                                 
23 I am certainly not arguing against support to local organisations and indeed governments through our 
(Irish Aid’s) aid programme in this regard.  Rather, I am proposing that we examine and reflect on the 
impact of this support in a more thorough manner.  In this regard I would like to acknowledge the 
financial support of both the Irish Council for Research in Humanities and Social Science (IRCHSS) 
and Trócaire for field research in Malawi on which this case study is based. 
